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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
IN C., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No.
9292

INTRUSION PREPAKT INC., a corporation,
Defendant .and Respondent.

BRIEF: OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Arnold Machinery Company IS a Utah
corporation engaged in the equip·ment sales and rental
business in Salt Lake City, with a branch office in
Idaho Falls. Defendant Intrusion P·repakt Inc., is a Delaware corporation engaged in the construction business.
On July 9, 1958, plaintiff and defendant entered into
a written lease whereby plaintiff rented to defendant a
large compressor (Tr. 2) having an agreed value of
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$13,000.00, (Ex. 1) for use by the defendant on a con .
struction job near Ashton, Idaho. Delivery was made and
defendant used the compressor which worked perfectly
from the time of delivery on July 10 until July 24. (Tr.
87, 97, 100, Ex. 9). 1\T o corn plaint was made by Defendant
to Plaintiff until July 24 ( Tr. 87).
On Thursday, July 24, while defendant was using
the con1pressor on the job, it overheated and stopped
operating. Defendant called plaintiff in Idaho Falls informing plaintiff that without compressed air defendant's job was shut down and demanded that plaintiff get
the machine operating by the next Monday (Tr. 5). Despite the fact that July 24 was a holiday and despite the
fact that the work had to be done on the holiday and
over the week-end, plaintiff's Idaho Falls men went to
Ashton to see if they could fix the compressor. Upon
examination they found that major parts of the compresor had been burned out because of overheating and
towed the compressor back to Idaho Falls. Plaintiff's
mechanic in Idaho Falls then ascertained that the compressor could not be fixed without new parts 'vhich were
not available for installation by l\fonday and so ordered
a new unit from the Salt Lake office for installation
in the comp-ressor, so that Defendants work would not
be delayed (Tr. 5). This was shipped immediately and
was installed in the compressor, and the compressor was
then delivered back to defendant at Ashton in time for
defendant's work on Monday (Tr. 5). The burned out
unit was shipped to the Salt Lake office where is was
found that the cause of the overheating was the inter-
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ruption of the flo'v of oil through the compressor with a
resultant lack of lubrication. The oil flow had been interrupted because of a brass cutting which somehow had
gotten into the oil (Tr. 51, 63). \\Then this was ascertained, plaintiff's Salt Lake office asked the Idaho Falls
branch to flush the oil from the machine to eliminate the
possibility that other cuttings might be in the oil and
might damage the machine. This was done (Tr. 7). At
the request of defendant, certain other minor adjustments were made (Tr. 7) and the compressor was then
used by defendant until September 20, 1958 with no further incident.
Plaintiff proceeded to repair the burned out portion
of the compressor in its Salt Lake shops (Tr. 47-81).
"\"Vhen the repairs were completed plaintiff demanded
payment for work done, parts and materials furnished
and expenses incident to said repairs and replacement
such as telephone calls, towing, freight, etc., basing its
claim therefor upon the following terms of the Lease:

"5. . . . lessee agrees to maintain said machinery and equipment in the same condition as
when delivered to it by the lessor, usual wear and
tear excepted and to pay all claims and damages
arising from defects therein, or from the use or
handling of said machinery and -equipment, whether from injuries to the person or property,
and to pay for all damages to the equipment,
except the usual and ordinary wear and tear,
during the life of this contract, and to return
said property in as good condition as when received . . . usual and ordinary wear and tear
excepted.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"6. The receipt and acceptance by the lessee
of said equipment shall constitute aclmowledgment that said pToperty has been accepted and
found in good, safe and serviceable condition, and
fit for use, unless the lessee makes claim to the
contrary to the lessor by registered mail with
returned receipt demanded, addressed to the lessor's home office within three days after receipt
of_said equipment."

"10. In the event of accident to, or breakage
of, any part of the equipment lessee may have
the same repaired by any competent person, firm
or corp·oration at its own expense or, upon notice
to the lessor as to such breakage or accident, the
lessor may repair said machinery for the lessee,
using reasonable diligence to make said repairs
or replacement in the shortest possible time, and
the lessee agrees to pay the lessor its regular
charges for any material or labor furnished in
making said repairs upon demand; in the event
any work is done outside of lessor's regular hours,
including 'vork necessary by wear and tear, by
reason of which lessor shall be required to pay
double time or other overtime charges to its employees, or to any one doing the work for lessee,
all such charges will be paid by the lessee to the
lessor."
"14. The lessee agrees to pay the lessor for
all loss and damages occasioned by fire, theft,
flood, accident, explosion, 'vreck, an act of God
or any other causes that may occur during the
life of this lease, and until such machinery has
been returned into the posession of the lessor and
accep~ted by it.'' (Ex. 1)
The dan1age was not due to usual and ordinary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

wear and tear according to the testirnony of the mechanics ( rl,r. 52, 64). In the opinion of all persons testifying
on the matter, the work was necessary and all charges
'vere reasonable in amount. The charges for repair, material and parts "rere the regular charges made by
plaintiff for such labor, material and parts and the
charges made for expenses incurred were the actual
a1nounts paid by plaintiff therefor. (Tr. 12-19, 80, 81,
83, 88).
Despite the terms and provisions of the lease, defendant refused to make any pay1nent.
At the close of all of the evidence, plaintiff n1oved
for a directed verdict in its favor both on the question
of liability and on the question of the amount to be
awarded (Tr. 104). This motion was taken under advisement and the matter submitted to the jury (Tr. 104).
The jury deliberated for a while and then asked for
further instructions, wanting to know how much the
repairs cost plaintiff. The court, despite Plaintiff's objection, instructed the jury that even though there was
no evidence on the point the jury under the evidence
before it had the rjght to bring in a verdict awarding
Plaintiff any amount the jury deemed proper (Tr. 113).
The jury then promptly brought in a verdict for $2500.00
instead of the $3580.52 sought by plaintiff's complaint..
The court entered judgment on the verdict which
judgment included interest at the legal rate on the
amount of the verdict pursuant to oral stipulation between counsel that the court might add to any verdict
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interest thereon at the legal rate.
The court subsequently refused to grant a motion
by plaintiff for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
said judgment to be in the full amount sought.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN THE
AMOUNT PRAYED.
ARGU~1ENT

POIN·T I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN THE
AMOUNT PRAYED.

All the evidence was uncontradicted on the following
points: The compressor was furnished pursuant to the
written lease ( Tr. 3). The lease provided that the cost
of repairs except those necessitated by fair "\Year and
tear should be borne by defendant (Ex. 1). The breakdown of the machine 'vas not the result of fair wear
and tear (Tr. 52, 64). ·The work done by plaintiff was
necessary in order to repair the compressor, and the
charges made by plaintiff were reasonable in amount
and were the usual charges made by plaintiff for such
work. (Tr. 12-19, 80, 81, 83, 88).
The fact that the court failed to direct the verdict
on the matter of liability was not prejudicial inasmuch
as the jury did find in favor of plaintiff, but the failure
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of the court to direct as to the amount of liability was
prejudicial.
Plaintiff had as witnesses all persons who had
worked on the compressor both in Idaho and in Utah
and each one gave his account of that portion of the
"\York done by him. Their testimony was not imp·eached.
The only ones testifying as to the nature of the repairs
and charges made therefor were these witnesses of
plaintiff. Defendant did not even attempt to show that
the charges were excessive or unreasonable nor that they
weren't the usual charges made by plaintiff or by anyone
else in the business. Yet, the court not only submitted
the question of the amount of the award to the jury but
even encouraged the jury to bring in a compromise
verdict by its comments to the jury when asked for
further instruction ( Tr. 113). Because of the jury's
request for information as to the cost of repairs to
plaintiff, it is obvious that the jury wanted to award
plaintiff a sum which would not include any legitimate
profit made by plaintiff on the repair job despite the
fact that the contract provided that such a p~rofit should
not be excluded. In paragraph 10 of the Lease, it is
provided:
"The lessee agrees to pay the lessor its regular charges for any material or labor furnished."
(Ex. 1)
The only evidence offered by defendant after plaintiff finished its prima facie case was defendant's job
superintendent's testimony as to how the machine was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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used by it and how it stopped working. Defendant's
only witness said nothing as to repairs (Tr. 95-102).
It is the duty of the lower court to direct a verdict
in the situation presented here where all the evidence
is in plaintiff's favor.
~1:oore,

in discussing the Federal practice, which
Utah should follow, says:
"Where no evidence is adduced to disprove
the prima facie case of the plaintiff and his evidence stands uncontradicted and unimpeached, the
court should direct." 5 Moore's Federal Practice,
2314, Note 7.
In Cannan v. Curkeet, 86 F.2d 573, the court said:
"It is elementary that, in Federal courts,
where undisputed evidence demands a verdict in
favor of one of the parties, it is the duty of the
judge to direct it.''
In Brandon v. Ho.Zman, 41 F.2d 586, a bank cashier,
according to the undisputed testimony, improperly paid
out money for his own gain. In affirming a verdict for
the plain tiff the court said :
"The verdict should be directed when the
evidence . . . with all inferences that the jury
could draw from it, leads to but one conclusion."
In Colthurst v. Lake J7iew State Bank, 18 F.2d 875,
in a suit on a note, where the only evidence was to the
effect that plaintiff was a holder in due course without
notice, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The court said that defendant does not have the right
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''to have a jury pass upon his claim" nor does "credibility of an uncontradicted and unimpeached \vitness in
all cases" present a jury question.

In Campagnie Generale Transatlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663, in affirming a directed
verdict for the plaintiff, the court said:

"When the plaintiff in error failed to make
ansvver to the prima facie evidence offered . . .
it was the duty of the court below to direct the
verdict."
In First National Bank & Trust Company of Muskogee v. Heilman, 62 F.2d 157, in a suit on a note, where
the only evidence was to the effect that plaintiff was
a holder in due course without notice, a directed verdict
for the plaintiff was denied by the lower court. This was
reversed. The court said:
"There are two classes of cases in which the
trial court should direct a verdict at the close of
the evidence (1) cases in which the evidence is
undisputed and (2) cases in which the evidence is
conflicting but is of so conclusive a character
that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion ought to set aside a verdict in opposition thereto .... The rule ap·plies notwithstanding the party introducing the evidence has the
burden of p·roof. . . . The instant case clearly
falls within the first class and the trial court
erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the
bank.''
53 Am. Jur. ·Trials.
"359.

Undisputed Facts Supporting One
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Conclusion. - The presence or absence of conflicting testimony in a case is a consideration by
which the courts are governed in directing verdicts. Where the material issues or controlling
facts are conceded, or the proof offered to establish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or uncontroverted, or such facts are conclusively established or established beyond dispute, or the evidence is all one way, and is unconflicting and
uncontradictory, and only one legitmate inference may be drawn, and there are no circumstances which tend to impair or impeach it, and
it is not susceptible of inherent weaknesses, improbabilities, and incongruities which in and of
themselves naturally arise to contradict or impeach the weight and credibility of the utterances
of the witnesses, the only question being one of
law, the court may, should, and must, direct a
verdict.
"361. Uncontradicted Oral Testimony-While
it is the province of the jury to determine not
only the weight and sufficiency of the evidence,
but the credibility of the witnesses who testify,
this rule is not t.o be taken as necessarily requiring the trial court to overrule a motion for a
directed verdict and submit a case to the jury
in order to p·ermit the jury to pass upon the credibility of a witness whose testimony is unimpeached and uncontradicted, and reasonably susceptible
to but one conclusion - the more generally approved rule is that it is not only permissable, but
proper, for a trial court to direct, upon unimpeached oral testimony given in behalf of the
party having the burden of proof, where such testimony is direct, positive, and unequivocal, is not
contradicted either directly or indirectly, and is
not susceptible of inherent weakness, improbabiliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ty, or incredibility. This p-rinciple underlies the
great majority of the cases cited in the preceding
sections which recognize it to be not only within
the power, but the duty, of the court to direct
verdicts when undisputed facts support only one
conclusion, or where a contrary verdict would
have no support in the evidence.
"386. When Verdict May Be Directed. Again, the plaintiff is entitled to .a direction in
his favor where the right to recover is overwhelmingly shown, \Vhere the plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to warrant a verdict in his favor and
no evidence has been adduced by the defendant
appreciably tending to overthrow the case made
by the plaintiff."
"Where there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to imp·each the witness upon
whose testimony an issue is based, the court
should give mandatory instruction." Citizens
Trttst & Sav. Bank v. Stackhouse, 91 SC 455, 74
SE 977, 40 LRA (NS) 454.
"Where the plaintiff's evidence makes a
prima facie case, and the defendant offers no
evidence, the court should, on motion, direct a
verdict for the plaintiff." Mason v. Sault, 93
Vt. 412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR 1426.
"It is fundamental that where there is no
evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's
claim, it is the court's duty to direct a verdict.
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the
court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion
is directed and must resolve every controverted
fact in his favor. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah
295, 209 P.2d 566. The inquiry, then, must be diSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rected toward whether reasonable minds could
disagree in this case on the evidence presented so
as to provide a question for the jury." Boskovich
v. Ut.ah Canst. Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P.2d 885, 886.
"The credibility, sufficiency, and weight of
the- evidence on a given subject are for the jury;
the question whether there is any evidence on the
subject is for the court. Where the testimony is
all one way, uncontradicted by any testimony
given in the case, either from a party's own witnesses or the other side, either in direct or crossexamination, or by any facts or circumstances in
the case, and is not ~n itsef in any way improbable or discredited, and but one legitimate inference may be drawn from it, and a case is
thereby made for the plaintiff or the defendant,
the duty rests upon the court to direct a verdict.''
Bo~tdeman v. Arnold, 200 Mich. 162, 166 NW 985,
8 ALR 789.
The court should not let the jury bring in any
amount it desires in disregard of the evidence. The lower
court sustained an objection to testimony upon the point
of how much an item cost the plaintiff as distinguished
from what its regular charge was, (Tr. 32) and then
turned around and allowed the jury to speculate on that
very point, even instructing the jury that it may disregard the evidence before it and bring in any portion
of the repair bill it desired (Tr. 113). Such is not the
concept of "jury trial'' as set out by the above authorities.
The jury should not be allo,ved to apply its own
concept of what the law should be, in a case involving
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the construction of a vvritten contract, where the

fact~

are undisputed. The construction of the written contract
and the application thereof to the undisputed facts was
the province of the court and not the jury. The annotation at 65 A.L.R. 648, 650, cites many cases to the
effect that the interpretation or construction of a written
contract is a question of law for the court. The annotation states :
"The following quotation from O'Connor v.
West Sacramento ·Co. (1922) 189 ·Cal. 7, 207 Pac.
527, embodies vvhat may be fairly regarded as
the position taken in the cases in which the courts
consciously regard the line "\vhich separates the
functon of the court from that of the jury, though
naturally there is considerable variation even
among such cases in formal statement of the
principle: 'The construction of a contract is always a matter of law for the court, no matter
how ambiguous or uncertain or difficult its terms,
and the jury can only assist the court by determining disputed questions of fact. If the facts
and circumstances to be considered in the interpretation of the contract are undisputed, there is
nothing to submit to the jury and the court must
direct a verdict in accordance with the construction placed on the contract by the court, in the
light of the admitted circumstances .... ' ''
There is no evidence upon which the jury could
justifiably reduce the claim of $3,580.52, which was fully
supported by the evidence, to the round figure of

$2,500.00.
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CO·NCLUSION
Prejudicial error was made which can 1e corrected
by the Supreme Court without the necessity of a new
trial by ruling that the lower court should have directed
a verdict in plaintff's favor in the sum of $3,580.52 as
prayed, together with interest thereon from September
12, 1958, the date the statemPnt of nlaintiff became due
and payable.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON &
LOWE, John W. Lowe
Attorneys for PlaintiJff
and Appellant

1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake·City, Utah
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